Abstract: This paper aims to study the optimality of a monetary union in West Africa by using a new methodology based on the analysis of convergence and co-movements between exchange rate misalignments. Two main advantages characterize this original framework. First, it brings together the information related to several optimum currency area criteriasuch as price convergence, terms of trade shocks, and trade and fiscal policies-going further than previous studies which are mainly based on only one criterion at a given time. Second, our study detects potential competitiveness differentials which play a key role in the debate on the optimality or not of a monetary union, as evidenced by the recent crisis in the Euro area. Relying on recent panel cointegration techniques and cluster analysis, our results show that the WAEMU area has a core composed by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal which can be joined by Ghana, Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, Gambia, and that Ghana and Senegal appear to be the best reference countries for the creation of the whole West Africa monetary union.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, our aim is to contribute to this debate by analyzing the optimality of forming a monetary union in West Africa. An abundant literature 2 , generally based on the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria, has investigated the relevance of a monetary union within the ECOWAS area. These studies highlight the heterogeneity of West African countries, and generally conclude that one of the main problems of forming a monetary union is the inclusion of Nigeria. Indeed, the latter-which is the main economy and the most populous country of the ECOWAS (around 60% of the revenue and 52% of the population)-is structurally very different from other countries of this area. Consequently, the benefits of the ECOWAS monetary union should be considered with caution especially for WAEMU countries. Indeed, the expected gains for WAEMU countries, which record low inflation rates, should be lesser than those of the other area members (see De Grauwe, 1996 or Debrun et al., 2005 . However, most of this previous literature is based on only one OCA criterion, leading 1 ECOWAS area is actually composed by fifteen countries: eight West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries which share the same currency named "CFA franc", and the others that have each their own currency. The WAEMU has as members Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Its CFA franc, issued by the Central Bank of West African States, has been pegged to the French Franc and to the Euro since 1999. The convertibility of the CFA franc is however unlimited relative to the Euro and guaranteed by the France. In exchange, the CFA zone countries depose at least 65% (50% for the WAEMU, since 2005) of their foreign reserves in a special operating account held by the French Treasury. The other ECOWAS countries are: Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. These countries, with the exception of Cape Verde and Liberia, stated their intention to create a new monetary union named West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) before 2015. Thereafter, the WAMZ would merge with WAEMU in 2020 in order to build a monetary union of ECOWAS. 2 See references in section 1.2.
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frequently to contradictory results as evidenced by studies on supply and demand shocks or output and price convergence. This illustrates the "problem of inconclusiveness" highlighted by the literature on the OCA theory (see for instance, Tavlas, 1994 or Mongelli, 2008 .
For facing these shortcomings, we go further than the previous studies by proposing a global indicator related to economic competitiveness which should play a key role in the debate on the optimality or not of a monetary union, especially after the recent crisis in the Euro area.
More specifically, we focus on the similarities and dissimilarities of ECOWAS member states in terms of economic competitiveness through analyzing exchange rate misalignments, defined as the difference between the observed exchange rate and its equilibrium level. Since the equilibrium exchange rate is defined as the real exchange rate that allows an economy to reach its internal and external equilibriums, exchange rate misalignments constitute not only an indicator of a country economic competitiveness, but also a useful indicator of the viability of a monetary union. 3 Indeed, large differences in competitiveness between countries within a monetary union could lead to current imbalances, as evidenced by the recent experience of the Euro area (see Coudert et al., 2012) . 4 In this context, it would be difficult for the common central bank to set up common and consensual policies (monetary and exchange rate), which in turn could challenge the stability of the union.
Consequently, we argue that a viable monetary union, which will be sustainable in the future, requires that countries forming this union should have close competitiveness levels. More specifically, we define as optimal a currency area in which economic policies are consistent and convergent. As real exchange rates affect and are affected by all other policies, we propose to test this optimality hypothesis by analyzing the behavior-convergence and comovements-of the real exchange rate misalignments.
Turning to methodological issues, we rely on the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate approach (BEER) introduced by Clark and MacDonald (1998) to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate of ECOWAS countries and derive corresponding misalignments. Within this 4 framework, the real equilibrium exchange rate is the solution of a long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. To consistently estimate such long-run relationship, we use various recent panel cointegration techniques (Pool Mean Group, Dynamic OLS and Fully-Modified OLS estimators) . We complement the investigation by a cluster analysis, allowing us to study similarities and dissimilarities of the CFA and WAMZ countries in terms of price competitiveness.
Using annual data over the 1985-2009 period, our results confirm the heterogeneity and the non optimality of the monetary unions in West Africa: CAEMC 5 , WAEMU and WAMZ. Despite these differences, among these areas, WAEMU seems to be the most homogeneous area with high correlation between its member countries' competitiveness level. WAEMU has also core countries composed by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal which share some common characteristics. Relying on cluster analyses, we show that this core can be joined by Ghana, Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, by Gambia from the WAMZ area. Nigeria, which appears alone in the WAMZ zone, displays interesting similarities with CAEMC member countries calling for their merging. Finally, in the perspective of the creation of the monetary union of ECOWAS, we show that Ghana and Senegal would be the best references for the area since they are institutionally stable and economically relatively strong. In addition, these two countries' misalignments are positively correlated to those of most ECOWAS member states. By corroborating the main results of Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2008) and Tsangarides and Queshi (2008) which use several variables related to the OCA criteria, our paper evidences the relevance of our global indicator based on exchange rate misalignments to assess the optimality of a monetary union.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follow. Section 1 presents the background of the ECOWAS area and reviews the literature on its optimality. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology and presents the results of panel unit root and cointegration tests, as well as the estimation of the long-run relationship. In section 3, we analyze the behavior of exchange rate misalignments before concluding the paper. 5 The Central African Economic and Monetary Community is the second monetary union of the CFA zone whose member countries are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. monetary union WAMZ whose common currency will be called "ECO", and the merging of the latter with the WAEMU in 2005. In this perspective, first order and second order convergence criteria have been defined. The first order criteria, whose achievements are decisive for the creation of the future monetary union, are: single digit inflation rate; budget deficit lower than 4%; external reserves greater than 3 months of imports and central bank financing of government budget deficit lower than 10% of previous year's tax revenue.
Concerning second order criteria, they focus on the monetary and exchange rate policies management (positive interest rate and stable nominal exchange rate), and also on the structure of public accounts (no domestic arrears, tax revenue greater than 20% of GDP, salary mass lower than 35% of tax revenue, and public investment greater than 20% of 
Literature review on ECOWAS
Empirical researches on the viability or feasibility of a monetary union in ECOWAS rely on the seminal work on OCA developed by Mundell (1961) and its extensions. While most of these studies show that a monetary union for ECOWAS area is not optimal since its costs outweigh its potential benefits, some remain optimistic because of the endogeneity of the OCA properties.
A monetary union compromised by heterogeneity
The OCA theory states that the loss of an independent monetary policy would be the main cost for a country when it joins a monetary union.
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This cost tends to be more important when countries of the monetary union are heterogeneous or are facing significant asymmetric shocks. Indeed, under these conditions, each country needs autonomous monetary and exchange rate policies to make the necessary adjustments. Thus, several studies focus on the heterogeneity and asymmetric shocks between member countries of the ECOWAS area. They conclude, in general, that the costs of the future monetary union will outweigh its benefits.
Using a dynamic factor model, Houssa (2008) indicates that a monetary union in ECOWAS would be economically costly given the asymmetry of supply shocks between countries. He also highlights positive correlation of demand shocks, but the latter-which have only a temporary impact on output-are less important than supply shocks in monetary union (see Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993) . Estimating VAR models, Coleman (2004) concludes to the existence of significant correlation between shocks within the CFA area (especially for the exchange rate shocks) contrary to the non-CFA countries. The latter are characterized by less symmetry between them and also with the CFA franc zone. More recently, Chuku (2012) highlights that internal shocks tend to be asymmetric while external ones were rather symmetric. Indeed, he shows that almost 85 percent of correlations in supply, demand and monetary shocks within the ECOWAS are asymmetric, while real exchange rate shocks (external shocks) tend to be symmetric. These studies perfectly illustrate the problem of inconclusiveness of OCA analysis previously quoted.
The issue of heterogeneity between African countries raises the question of the geography of monetary unions that was asked by Masson and Patillo (2004 is not economically viable. However, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone could connect to the 'core' of the WAEMU to create their common currency. In the same vein, Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) use the cluster analysis on a set of variables related to the OCA theory and convergence criteria. They show that WAEMU and WAMZ areas countries do not form a homogeneous group and also highlight significant heterogeneities between CAEMC and WAEMU as Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005) . However, they stress interesting similarities between the CAEMC and WAMZ countries.
Bangaké (2008) Unlike his previous papers, Masson (2006 Masson ( , 2008 considers the endogeneity phenomenon in his cost-benefit analysis of a monetary union in West Africa. He supposes that monetary union would have significant effects on trade within the area. However, his conclusions do not differ far from his previous studies. Indeed, he finds that ECOWAS countries-except Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ghana-would have a net welfare loss following the establishment of the common currency even if the latter leads to double the trade volume.
These findings are mainly due to asymmetric shocks of terms of trade but also to differences in terms of fiscal discipline reputation.
Monetary union viable owing to endogeneity criteria
Since the seminal papers of Rose (1996, 1997) , it is well known that the monetary union can strengthen economic similarity of its member countries through more trade (lower transaction costs), and business cycle synchronization and improvement of policy credibility (multilateral surveillance).
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These authors show that as countries with closer trade links tend to have more correlated business cycles, monetary unions would be more suitable ex post than ex ante. Afterward, Rose (2000) uses a gravity model to highlight the significant effect of currency union on trade which is higher than the effect of exchange rate volatility reduction. Consequently, he concludes that countries in monetary union trade more than others, even compared to countries in fixed exchange rate regime. In addition, Frankel and Rose (2002) show that monetary union also leads to higher welfare (increase of income per capita) through trade increase. In the field of policy credibility, authors such as De Grauwe (1996) argue that when a country-especially high inflation country-joins a monetary union, its monetary policy will benefit from credibility gains (see also Alesina et al., 2002) . For
African economies, Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) state that they can resort to monetary unions to fill the weakness of their institutions which do not allow them to establish credible and sound macroeconomic policies.
Rose's methodology has been used in large literature trying to highlight the phenomenon of endogeneity inherent in monetary unions. Concerning African countries, Carrière (2004) and Qureshi and Tsangarides (2012) use this method to study the effect of the monetary union on trade in the African continent. These authors find significant effects of common currency on the bilateral trade as Rose (2000) . However, Qureshi and Tsangarides (2012) show also that the effects of common currency on trade are not significantly different to those of hard peg.
This result leads to one question: can African countries opt to hard peg rather than monetary union to achieve their goals in terms of economic integration and development? The Rose's effect was also emphasized by Diop (2007) for ECOWAS countries, showing that the effect of monetary union in this area has the same magnitude as that found by Rose (2000) . 9 Although not numerous, other recent studies are more optimistic about the viability of a monetary union in ECOWAS. According to Debrun et al. (2010) for instance, all ECOWAS countries, especially those belonging to the WAMZ, would have a net welfare gain in forming a common currency except the Gambia. This result is mainly due to the positive externalities associated to the monetary union itself, such as increase in trade, cycle synchronization, and development of mechanisms for stabilization or risk sharing. Tapsoba (2009) emphasizes that papers on heterogeneity of shocks are static and do not incorporate the effects induced by monetary union. He states that a monetary union in the ECOWAS should be beneficial for the countries of the area through more trade integration and higher symmetry of shocks. This author suggests to ECOWAS countries to develop a regional credit market which facilitates the risk-sharing strategies since, for him, saving would be a tool to adjust to shocks and to allow the sharing of heterogeneous risks. Analyzing the variability of real exchange rates' shocks, Ogunkola (2005) is also optimist about the sustainability of a monetary zone in ECOWAS. Referring to Von Hagen and Neumann (1994) and using monthly and quarterly data, he shows that the variability of real exchange rates' shocks of ECOWAS countries decreases over time. For him, this process has been facilitated by structural adjustment programs. However, he underlines that significant differences remain between CFA and non CFA countries. His conclusions are thus in favor of the establishment of the WAMZ (to a lesser extent of the ECOWAS) monetary union.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

Determinants of equilibrium exchange rates
Our study covers a panel of 17 Sub-Saharan African 10 countries belonging to CFA and WAMZ areas. In order to determine real equilibrium exchange rates of those economies, we refer to the model proposed by Couharde et al. (2012a) which is inspired from Edwards (1988) and Baffes et al. (1999) . Their model provides relevant determinants of the real exchange rates of developing economies 11 which can be summarized as follow:
Productivity differentials (Prod) known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect: a positive productivity shock in the tradable good sector relative to the non-tradable good sector leads to a wage increase in the former sector; and thus the moving of the workforce towards this sector.
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Thus, the real exchange rate appreciates through prices increase in sheltered sectors since their demands exceed their supplies. The impact on the equilibrium real exchange is then expected to be positive.
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Net foreign asset position (Nfa): Standard intertemporal macroeconomic models predict that debtor countries will need a more depreciated real exchange rate to generate the trade surpluses necessary to pay their external liabilities (Lee et al., 2008) . Similarly, when countries have relatively high net foreign assets, they can "afford" a higher appreciation of their real exchange rate while remaining solvent even if it is likely to generate current account deficits. So, the expected effect is positive.
Terms of trade (Tot):
They are measured by the ratio of export prices to import prices. The improvement of the terms of trade leads to an increased production of tradable goods and a reallocation of resources in favor of these sectors. Consequently, the trade balance will be improved through rising exports leading to an appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange 10 Depending on the data availability, we select thirteen countries of CFA area and four WAMZ area countries (see detail in table B in appendix). Given the small time dimension in several developing countries, panel data analysis is more relevant than time series analysis. Chudik and Mongardini (2007) apply both methods on a set of 36 Sub-Saharan Africa countries; they show that the panel method is more robust and leads to better results. The advantages of the using of panel data framework are summarized by Lopez-Villavicencio (2006) . 11 These variables are frequently used in the literature (see among others Toulaboe, 2002; Abdih and Tsangarides, 2006; Roudet et al., 2007; Gnimassoun, 2012) . 12 Under the assumptions of internal mobility of production factors (labor), equal pay between the two sectors and equality between the real wage and productivity (perfect competition). 13 The exchange rate is defined such as an increase corresponds to its appreciation.
rate. At the same time, this process may be accompanied by a substitution between local products-which become more expensive-and imported products, leading therefore to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Consequently, the impact of the terms-of-trade variable is undefined and depends on the income and substitution effects' magnitude. However, empirical works generally suggest that the income effect dominates the substitution one (see Dufrénot and Yehoue, 2005) .
Openness (Open):
This variable is a proxy of studied countries' trade policies. The reduction of tariff increases the level of trade and vice versa. The response of the real equilibrium exchange rate depends on the impact of openness on the current account. If the current account deteriorates, the real equilibrium exchange rate should depreciate to restore external equilibrium. On the contrary, the equilibrium exchange rate will appreciate when the reduction of tariff leads to an improvement of the current account. Consequently, the expected effect is ambiguous, but the empirical literature generally found a negative impact (see Dufrénot and Yehoue, 2005; Mongardini and Rayner, 2009 ).
Government spending (Gov):
The effects of public expenditures depend on their composition.
If they are mainly composed by tradable goods, their increase will lead to the depreciation of the real equilibrium exchange rate. However, it is usually assumed that government spending in developing countries is mainly composed by non-tradable goods. In this case, the increase of public spending leads to a rise in internal prices, which generates the appreciation of the real equilibrium exchange rate. The impact of this variable on the real equilibrium exchange rate must then be positive.
Thus, the relationship between the real effective exchange rate (Reer) and its fundamentals is written as follows: 
Panel unit root and cointegration tests
Before estimating Equation (1) Pesaran, 2004) . If all series under consideration are found to be integrated, we then test for the existence of a long-run relationship between the REER and its determinants using the error correction model based cointegration tests of Westerlund (2007) . Compared to the well known cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 , Westerlund (2007) tests are large enough to allow accounting for dependencies between countries. In addition, Westerlund (2007) developed these tests in order to propose an alternative to residual-based cointegration tests which failed to reject, in many studies, the no-cointegration hypothesis even in the cases where cointegration is strongly suggested by the theory as in the BEER approach. 2 show that all variables are integrated, except the degree of openness which appears to be stationary. Consequently, we do not consider the degree of openness in the cointegration relationship. 
Unit root tests
Cointegration tests
We test the long-run relationship between the REER and its integrated fundamentals by using error-correction-based panel cointegration tests of Westerlund (2007) , which can be described as follows:
Where t d corresponds to the deterministic components (constant and/or trend),  is the first difference operator, pi the number of lags, qi the number of leads and x i denotes the fundamentals. it e is the error term which is independent and identically distributed. 
Estimation results and interpretation
In order to estimate Equation (1), we use three recent panel cointegration techniques (PMG, DOLS and FMOLS estimators) which allow us to provide consistent estimations of the coefficients. The Pooling Mean Group (PMG) estimator, proposed by Pesaran et al. (1997 Pesaran et al. ( , 1998 , is an intermediate estimator which allows the short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across countries while the long-run coefficients are constrained to be the same for all countries. The Dynamic OLS (DOLS), developed by Kao and Chiang (2000) and Mark and Sul (2003) in the panel data framework, consist in including advanced and delayed values of the explanatory variables in the cointegration relationship in order to eliminate inference problems of standard panel estimators. Indeed, although the OLS estimator of the cointegrating vector is super-convergent, the distribution of coefficients is asymptotically biased and depends on nuisance parameters associated with the presence of unit roots. In this study, we apply the DOLS approach proposed by Mark and Sul (2003) which has the same property as PMG since it constraints the long-run coefficients to be identical for all countries and allows short-run dynamics to differ freely across countries.
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Finally, we use the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) which is developed by Pedroni (2000 Pedroni ( , 2001 . As the DOLS approach, the FMOLS estimator corrects the standard pooled OLS estimator for serial correlation and endogeneity of regressors caused by the presence of unit roots. In the panel setting, the FMOLS long-run coefficients are obtained by averaging the N individual estimated coefficients.
17 Table 4 sums up the estimation results. 16 According to several papers, this assumption seems to be more pertinent in the context of equilibrium exchange rate studies (see Lopez-Villavicencio, 2006 ).
All considered explanatory variables are significant at conventional levels for all estimation methods. Fundamentals have also the expected sign highlighting the relevance of the theoretical model and the estimators. Our results confirm the presence of a BalassaSamuelson effect in the countries under review, since the elasticities associated to productivity are positive and significant. As predicted in theoretical standard inter-temporal macroeconomic models, the net foreign asset position has a positive and significant effect on the real equilibrium exchange rate. The positive relationship between the terms of trade and real effective exchange rate indicates that the income effect outweighs the substitution effect.
The government spending has also a positive effect on the real equilibrium exchange rate confirming that in these countries, government spending is mainly composed by non-tradable goods. Moreover, the size of the coefficients is in line with previous empirical studies on African and developing countries. Indeed, Chudik and Mongardini (2007) 
DYNAMICS OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENTS
We use the coefficients displayed in table 4 to assess real equilibrium exchange rates. We then deduce misalignments as the difference between the observed real exchange rates and their equilibrium values. As three methods have been used to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate, three different misalignment series will be derived for each country. We use the methodology developed by Elbadawi et al. (2008) 18 to assess the misalignments for all estimators and all countries. The latter are represented in Figure A2 in appendix. Afterwards, we apply a simple mean of countries' misalignments to obtain a unique and robust estimation.
This allows us to control the uncertainty related to coefficients. 18 As shown by the authors, this methodology is more relevant in a panel data framework.
Similarities and difference in exchange rate misalignments' behaviours
Regional misalignments
We consider the misalignments of four different areas: WAEMU, CAEMC, WAMZ and WAMZ without Nigeria (noted hereafter, WAMZ_WNGA). The regional misalignments are calculated as the weighted averages of misalignments of states belonging to the area. The weights used correspond to the share of each country in the considered area's real GDP (see currency (see Gnimassoun, 2012) . Compared to the CFA zone monetary unions, the misalignment within the WAMZ area is significantly larger. It is also out of phase with that of the CFA area, until 1999, particularly during the 1994-1999 period. Indeed, over this period, the CFA zone countries are characterized by undervalued real exchange rates partly due to the effects of the CFA franc devaluation of 1994 while real exchange rates in the WAMZ area exhibits a strong overvaluation. However, since early 2000, the misalignment of all areas is negative although significant differences in levels remain. This synchronization of misalignments' cycles has two main explanations. On the one hand, it can be explained by internal factors related to the convergence criteria such as more stable exchange rate and more suitable economic policies. On the other hand, undervalued real exchange rates of these areas member states could come from the significant improvement of their terms of trade in 2000s through increasing commodity prices and also from better net foreign asset positions in recent years (see figure A1 in appendix) . Indeed, the improvement of the terms of trade or of the net foreign asset position leads to higher equilibrium exchange rate, and increases therefore the probability of having an undervalued exchange rate.
Since WAMZ area misalignment is significantly dominated by that of the Nigeria, which products almost 90% of the area's real GDP, we also consider the WAMZ region without this 
A positive (resp. negative) value corresponds to an overvaluation (resp. undervaluation).
In order to strengthen our analysis, we also study the correlation between regional misalignments (table 5) Note: a, b, c and d indicate that correlations are significant at respectively 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%.
Intra-regional misalignments
The analyses above by focusing on synchronization on regional misalignments only presents the major drawback that insufficient concern is taken in analyzing the likely heterogeneity between countries belonging to the same area. In order to overcome this drawback, we analyze, in this section, the synchronization of misalignments within the different areas using correlation is low in CAEMC compared to WAEMU, suggesting that the later area is more optimal than the former one. Surprisingly, 100% of competitiveness shocks within WAMZ are positively correlated, with 68% of them higher than 0.50 (but lower than 0.75) and there is no negative correlation of misalignments. This can be related to the fact that WAMZ countries frequently use their exchange rates to respond to economic shocks as previously argued in section 1.1 (see table 1 ).
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The features of the misalignments' correlations within ECOWAS are similar to those of the CAEMC. Apart from accounting the correlations of misalignments within WAEMU area, this result is due to large correlations between Ghana and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone and WAEMU member states indicating that these two countries could join the WAEMU to share a common currency without much difficulty. Cross regional correlations of misalignments, defined as correlation between countries (i) and (j) belonging to two different areas, confirm this analysis. They also show that Mali and Burkina Faso are closest to the member countries of WAMZ area. In contrast, Togo, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria are negatively correlated to the countries of the other area. Thus, they will be less comfortable than other countries in the future monetary union of ECOWAS. Compared to the CAEMC-WAMZ union, the ECOWAS has more negative correlations and is thus less optimal. Indeed, Nigeria and Gambia seem more closed to the CAEMC than the WAEMU area. In sum, the analysis of misalignments shows that CFA zone monetary unions have the same phases of misalignments despite their heterogeneity. It also highlights a relative compatibility between WAEMU and the WAMZ area without Nigeria which is more close to the CAEMC zone. However, a significant convergence has been achieved between area' competitiveness since the establishment of convergence criteria in 2001. Finally, regarding competitiveness evolutions, cross regional correlations of misalignments highlight interesting similarities of Ghana and Sierra Leone with the WAEMU area, and Nigeria and Gambia with the CAEMC countries.
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Convergence of exchange rate misalignments
In order to strengthen our previous results regarding heterogeneity of the monetary unions, we assess the dispersion of misalignments and study their sigma-convergence within considered areas by analyzing the evolution of their standard errors. competitiveness levels of its member states. This convergence is more remarkable if we do not take into account Nigeria. With a low and stable dispersion of misalignments, the WAEMU area seems to be the most optimal area in West Africa. In contrast, the CAEMC area displays a lack of convergence since it exhibits larger dispersion of exchange rate misalignments than other areas. However, this is largely due to the Central African Republic which does not seem to be compatible with other countries of the area. Without the latter country, the CAEMC countries also display a relatively stable dispersion of misalignments, even if it remains higher than those of WAEMU and WAMZ.
Delimiting the borders of the ECOWAS area: a cluster analysis
As Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005) and Tsangarides and Queshi (2008) , we implement a cluster analysis to study similarities and dissimilarities between West African countries in terms of economic competitiveness. However, while these authors use several variables related to the OCA criteria to study the homogeneity of West African, we focus here only on exchange rate misalignments as a global indicator of optimality of a monetary area.
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In practice, the cluster analysis is carried out in four steps. The first one consists in defining the number of variables (features, P) for N objects to study. In our case, N corresponds to the number of countries (N=17) and P corresponds to five years average of countries' misalignments from 1985 to 2009 (P=5).
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In the second step, we choose the dissimilarity coefficient or distance,
, between two objects ( j x and k x ). For measuring the distance, several methods are proposed in the literature, the most used being the Euclidean distance (or Euclidean distance squared). In this study we use the latter described as follow for p variables
The third step consists in choosing the dissimilarity coefficient between two clusters. This choice determines the shape of the homogeneous groups. Among agglomerative methods proposed in the literature 20 , Ward's method is the most used. This method is a general hierarchical clustering approach where groups are joined to maximize an objective function.
More specifically, it consists to join two groups that result in the minimum increase in the error sum of squares. In addition to Ward's method, we use two alternative approaches (single-linkage and centroid-linkage methods) to check the robustness of our results. Singlelinkage clustering computes the similarity or dissimilarity between two groups as the similarity or dissimilarity between the closest pair of observations between the two groups.
Concerning the centroid method, the distance between two clusters is calculated as the sum of distances between cluster means for all of the variables. The three approaches used in this study can be described by the following recurrence formula developed by Lance and Williams (1967) : summarized in table C in appendix, depend on the used cluster-analysis method. 19 The choice of P does not significantly influence our findings. Results for other values of P are available upon request from authors. 20 For more details on these methods, see Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) . 
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The first graph represents the dendrogram of the all 17 countries of our sample using Ward's method. It identifies a core for the WAEMU area that is composed by Burkina Faso, Mali, In order to analyze the formation of the future monetary union of ECOWAS, the other three graphs shown here concern only countries of this area. The Ward's method validates the strategy adopted by ECOWAS leader which consists to form WAMZ monetary union which will merge with the WAEMU. According to this method, the competitiveness level of WAMZ countries is more homogeneous with the other members of this area than with countries belonging to the WAEMU area. However, heterogeneity remains within these two areas. The results from the Ward's method are different to those obtained with the two other methods.
The centroid method corroborates the core of the WAEMU which can be joined by the cluster formed by Ghana and Sierra Leone, and by Gambia, to a lesser extent. This method also highlights the differences between Nigeria and the rest of ECOWAS member states.
Concerning single-linkage method, it confirms the proximity between Ghana and the WAEMU countries, and the dissimilarity of the latter with Nigeria. Sierra Leone and Gambia can also join the WAEMU, but with most costs than Ghana. On the whole, these findings corroborate those of Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2008) and Tsangarides and Queshi (2008) which use several variables related to the OCA criteria, highlighting the relevance of using the exchange rate misalignments as a global indicator of the optimality of a monetary union.
Which anchor currency for the ECOWAS area?
Finally, we seek to determine which currency could act as the best anchor for the ECOWAS area by analyzing co-movements between exchange rate misalignments, in the spirit of the methodology developed by Alesina et al. (2002) . In order to analyze the cost and benefit for several countries to adopt as an anchor the dollar, the euro or the yen, those authors study the co-movements of considered countries' prices and output with respectively those of the US, Euro area and Japan. Co-movements are computed as the standard deviation of errors from AR (2) estimations of relative prices and output. Such econometric method, frequently used in the OCA literature, could not be relevant in our study since (i) exchange rate misalignments are estimated, and (ii) the time dimension is quite low (25 years). Accordingly, we use a methodology recently proposed by Yetman (2011) which is a year-by-year decomposition of 26 the correlation between two countries. As Alesina et al. (2002) ' co-movements analysis, this method aims to determine the best anchor for a country and also to identify periods in which countries are more or less correlated to the anchor. The more the co-movements with the chosen reference currency are high, the more the countries will take advantage of pegging their currencies to this reference currency. For the ECOWAS area, since there is no natural leader which applies sound monetary policy, we consider five different references. The first one is Nigeria which is the first economy of the area but has higher inflation rate and public deficit than WAEMU countries. Given that the monetary unions of the CFA zone are known for their economic stability compared to other SSA countries, we consider them as second and third plausible references for the area. As mentioned by Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) , it is the weakness of institutions that prevents these countries to implement sound economic policies. Thus, we chose two countries (Ghana and Senegal) which are known for the stability of their institutions compared to other countries of the ECOWAS area. In addition, these two countries are respectively the second economy of the WAMZ and the WAEMU areas. and Ghana show similar co-movements with the rest of the area members. This last result leads to the conclusion that countries with strong institutions seem to be the best references for all ECOWAS area. On the whole, figure 3 shows that co-movements of exchange rate misalignments have been improved in recent years, whatever the considered reference. 
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to investigate the optimality of currency union in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by paying a particular attention to the economic competitiveness of member countries. Large differences in competitiveness between countries within a monetary union could lead to current imbalances and thus may challenge the stability of the union, as evidenced by the recent experience of the Euro area.
With the recent crisis in the Euro area, one could expect that the economic competitiveness will have an important place in the debate on the optimality or not of a monetary union.
As a proxy of competitiveness, we consider exchange rate misalignments, which constitute a Complemented by a cluster analysis, our findings show that, among these areas, WAEMU is the most homogeneous zone with high correlation between its member countries competitiveness level. This area is characterized by a core composed by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal which could be joined by Ghana, Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, by
Gambia from the WAMZ area. Our results also evidence a specific group of oil-exporting countries by showing similarities between Nigeria misalignments and those of the CAEMC area, indicating that the former country would have a greater interest in joining the CAEMC area, rather than the WAEMU area. Finally, in the perspective of the creation of the monetary union of ECOWAS, Ghana and Senegal would be the best references for the area. Indeed, in addition to be institutionally stable and economically relatively strong countries, their misalignments are positively correlated to those of most ECOWAS member states. 
TABLES
Authors calculations Neer
Nominal effective exchange rate is a weighted average of nominal bilateral exchange rates against the main trading partners.
World Development Indicators (World bank)
Weights The share of first ten partners in imports and exports of goods and services of the considered country over the 1996-2009 subperiod.
Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) Prod
Corresponds to the real PPP GDP per capita of the considered country relative to its main trading partners, using the same weights as for the calculation of the REER series. 
